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Kafka’s preoccupation with the law and legal institutions within his fictional writings 
has always been a particularly fecund source of ideas for legal and political 
philosophy. Notwithstanding the justifiable emphasis on the historical and 
biographical situation of Kafka’s literary texts in jurisprudential commentary, those 
texts may also serve a valuable, autonomous function as a form of legal critique that 
supplements the doctrinal approaches of conventional legal theory. With this context 
in mind, the article presents a critical reading of three dominant juridical themes in 
Kafka’s fiction: the relationship between slander and guilt; the significance of 
judgment over justice in the legal process; and, the association of necessity and 
immanence in the constitution of the legal subject. It seeks to demonstrate the specific 
contributions to legal critique of the rhetorical, structural and aesthetic elements of 
Kafka’s fictional treatment of law and legal authority. 
 
 
“Reading” Kafka has become a precarious undertaking within literary criticism. At least since 
Walter Benjamin’s 1938 review of Max Brod’s biography on Kafka,1 there has been 
continuous admonition of the perils of overinterpretation in Kafka scholarship, understood 
both in the sense of an excessive reliance on analogical similarity,2 and more broadly of 
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interpreting through the lens of doctrinal paradigms (whether psychological, metaphysical, 
theological or socio-political). It is often remarked that Kafka’s unique writing techniques 
have set the trap for the interpreter entering this patulous, semiotic field – the architectural 
manipulation of structure, the precision and economy of the prose, the anonymity of 
characters and places, the pedestrian dialogues that seem to herald more significant events, 
among others. Moreover, the burgeoning biographical corpus, much of it derivative of the 
autobiographical, has raised the stakes in this veritable battlefield between literal and 
metaphorical readings (and the many species in between), encouraged along by Kafka’s 
intensely self-reflective stance on writing – witness, for example, the many allusions to the 
tormented, even demonic, condition of the writer in his diaries and letters. Yet, as Roberto 
Calasso intuits, “It’s awkward to speak of symbols in Kafka, because Kafka experienced 
everything as symbol,”3 it would seem to be a futile, if not unjust, gesture to introduce 
symbolic significance to writing that arguably seeks its own escape from the pervasiveness of 
a deeply symbolic existence.  
In this context, and out of an interest in allowing Kafka’s texts to speak for 
themselves, the article’s approach is to engage in a reading of Kafka’s writings that 
demonstrates the specific ways in which the rhetorical, structural and aesthetic elements of 
his fictional treatment of law and legal authority have contributed to legal critique. Utilising 
and developing some of the ideas of his more sensitive interpreters, we shall examine three 
dominant conceptual strands in Kafka’s account of juridical power. Firstly, Kafka’s 
subversion of the function of guilt in legal responsibility, understood in terms of Agamben’s 
contention of the trial as a process of self-slander. Secondly, Kafka’s critique of the 
formalistic aspects of legal positivism, which reveals the law’s preoccupation with process 
and judgment rather than guilt, and suggests that the possibility of justice must be perceived 
                                                          
3 Calasso (2005), p 118. 
 
 
3 
 
through an understanding of the self-contradiction of freedom and the conflation of legal and 
moral responsibility. Thirdly, the necessity and immanence of the legal order – especially 
manifest in the recurring relation between physical and symbolic violence – and the 
significance of the ontological division of the human and inhuman (a crucial influence on 
Agamben’s biopolitical thesis) for legal subjectivity.  
 
A. Slander and Guilt 
Giorgio Agamben’s  suggestion of the significance of the concept of slander within The Trial 
is worthy of investigation, if only because it opens the text to a reading that eschews the 
conventional treatment of guilt, responsibility and interiority normally associated with its 
protagonist’s confrontation with the seemingly intractable and impenetrable legal system. As 
he notes, the doctrine of kalumnia in Roman criminal procedure provided as punishment for 
the making of a false accusation the branding of the initial “K” on the forehead of the 
Kalumniator4—this branding of infamy is referred to by Cicero and attested in various 
Roman law sources.5 According to those sources, “A lex Remmia set the rule that a 
calumniator was to be tried before the same tribunal (quaestio) before which he had 
prosecuted the innocent accused.”6 That Josef K. represents the kalumniator, thus 
simultaneously the innocent accused and the false accuser, reconfigures the principle causa in 
The Trial as a proceeding for self-slander. The trial, then, exists only in relation to—as a 
                                                          
4 Agamben (2011), p 20. 
5 ‘A man is innocent. But although he is free from guilt he is not free from suspicion…if you act in 
such a way as to accuse a man of having murdered his father, without being able to say why or how; 
and if you are only barking without any ground for suspicion...if I know these judges well, they will 
so firmly affix to your heads that letter to which you are so hostile that you hate all the Calends too, 
that you shall hereafter be able to accuse no one but your own fortunes’: Cicero, pro Sext. Rosc. 
Amerino, c20 (1903); ‘A party guilty of calumny is also branded with infamy, if judgment is rendered 
against him on that account’: Justinian, D. 3.6 (1932), p 7.  
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dependency but also its justification—the capacity of the accused, being convinced of his 
own innocence, to slander himself and thereby render himself guilty. The narrative is initiated 
with the mere revelation of an accusation, a slander, against K., an accusation whose author is 
never revealed, while it is K. who presumes to be under arrest when confronted by the 
intruders, and who presents himself to the court, already marked as an accused. In that sense, 
K. constructs the particular case against himself as much as he is its subject. For Agamben, 
Kafka’s point of departure is precisely the premise that “Every man initiates a slanderous trial 
against himself,” that “guilt does not exist—or rather, guilt is nothing other than self-slander, 
which consists in accusing oneself of a non-existent guilt.”7 Josef K.’s anxiety and 
preoccupation with the accusation, and indeed with the authorities which implicitly legitimise 
it, eludes his own crucial involvement in the legal process, just as every individual, far from 
“underpinning his existence with retrospective justifications,” in actual fact erects his life on 
his justifications.8  
 If the function of the trial is not the determination of innocence and guilt but the 
treatment of self-slander, the law can be nothing other than the accusation itself. “The 
slanderous trial is a case where there is no case, where being indicted is the indictment 
itself.”9 This is implicit in the statements of those advising K., external to his predicament: 
his uncle says as much when he resignedly invokes the adage that such trials are lost from the 
start, as does the prison chaplain who, prior to professing himself to be in the service of the 
court, concedes that “the proceedings gradually merge into the judgment.”10 Indeed, in his 
final moment, an ambiguous moment of either relative lucidity or credulity, K. questions—in 
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apparent rhetoric but lacking any rhetorical intent—the existence of the judge he had never 
seen and the high court he had never reached. The illusory nature of the court as an institution 
is raised as a possibility precisely at the moment when the farcical spectacle of the execution 
traverses the point beyond which logic can function, where K.’s assurance in the reliability of 
reason is lost. As Agamben suggests, in Kafka the formal character of the law is remarkable 
for its lack of content, but on this count it is all the more pervasive: “the existence and the 
very body of Joseph K. ultimately coincide with the Trial; they become the Trial.”11 
 In a sense, self-accusation evades the attribution of guilt, but it does so on the pretext 
that truth itself is called into question. In this light, the interpretation of the elusive incipit12 to 
The Trial becomes a crucial philological issue: to what extent does the statement purport to 
reveal the relative guilt or innocence of K.? Remarking on the significance of a literal 
interpretation, Davide Stimilli associates the fact of a slander with the notion of innocence, 
renouncing (in sympathy with Orson Welles) the metaphysical Christian notion of guilt at 
birth.13 For Welles, the significance of the theme of guilt in The Trial is to call into question 
particular attitudes to innocence and guilt, as distinct from their attribution as facts.14 Though 
no doubt a compelling view, such an approach presupposes a certain security in a “literal” 
reading, which is far from obvious given the divergent approaches among the translators. In 
his Translator’s Preface to The Trial, Breon Mitchell argues that previous English translations 
have opted for terminology which unequivocally suggests K.’s innocence—“without having 
                                                          
11 Agamben (1998), p 53. 
12 In Breon Mitchell’s translation, ‘Someone must have slandered Josef K., for one morning, without 
having done anything truly wrong, he was arrested’: Kafka (1998a), p 3. 
13 Stimilli (2012), p 107. 
14 ‘The point is not whether he’s guilty or innocent. It’s an attitude towards guilt and innocence—
that’s the point of the story. Because what is guilt? The guilt of what?’: Welles and Bogdanovich 
(1993), p 286. 
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done anything wrong”—whereas the German syntax and the introspective nature of the 
narration would suggest that the veracity of K.’s observation is in doubt: “To claim that K. 
has done nothing ‘Böses’ is both more and less than to claim he has done nothing wrong. 
Josef K. has done nothing truly wrong, at least in his own eyes.”15 Whatever the merit of this 
view, it does draw out the underlying ambiguity of the purportedly false accusation that is 
believed to have initiated the trial process, and, more to the point, the sense in which the 
individual accused is responsible to the law (in his own collusion) as well as before it. It is 
decisive that the thought of the trial should pervade K.’s consciousness; lacking knowledge of 
the charge and its basis, he must persistently account for his presence as an accused, which, 
in some respects, wholly instructs his relationship to the law via the obscurant court and its 
perversely officious representatives. K.’s indifference to being represented and scepticism of 
his lawyer’s ability to penetrate the court system are reflected in the private and inscrutable 
nature of the judicial process. It cannot be overlooked that the proceedings are not public, and 
yet the fact of the accusation against K. is known to others; that the court records and writ of 
indictment are not accessible to the accused, and yet the gravity of the charges is presented as 
given, manifest in the reactions of K’s uncle and his lawyer (the former laments the disrepute 
to the family name that such a serious predicament entails, while the latter questions whether 
his strength is “equal to this most difficult of tasks”16).  
 In a diary entry Kafka comments on the shared fate of the protagonists of his first two 
novels: “Rossman and K., the innocent and the guilty, both executed without distinction in 
the end, the guilty one with a gentler hand, more pushed aside than struck down.”17 We 
cannot assume that Kafka’s reference to K. as guilty is a revelation of authorial intent; it may 
                                                          
15 Kafka (1998a), xviii-xix. 
16 Kafka (1998a), p 100. 
17 Kafka (1976), pp 343-44. 
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be no more than a reflection of the fact that the narrative revolves around the slanderous 
presumption of guilt from which K. never manages to extricate himself. In any case, this 
singular rumination offers a glimpse of how Kafka may have perceived the irony in K.s 
predicament: the accusation, as presumption of guilt, is all that stands between K.’s 
innocence and guilt, which is as much to say that the consequences of each are 
indistinguishable, that the innocence-guilt opposition is not actually determinative of 
judgment. In effect, the slander has set in train a juridical process in which the designators 
“innocence” and “guilt” are no longer meaningful. The slander, as accusation, is the causa, 
that which indicts, or to be precise, the indictment itself, with the accused as the object (cosa, 
thing) of the indictment;18 the legal process, then, follows from and absorbs the accusation, 
the truth of which no longer bears relation to the attribution of guilt. 
That the narrative commences with a speculation, the veracity of which becomes 
increasingly marginal to the events that unfold, lends some significance to the subjective and 
parochial tenor of K’s narratorial perspective.19 The truth of the accusation, thus the question 
of K.’s innocence or guilt, occupies a comparatively small stage, and is always subverted by 
logistical, often pedantic, preoccupations filtered through K’s self-consciousness and 
instructed by his sensibility for order. In the opening arrest scene, the guards, who make a 
point of their inferior station and meagre knowledge of their department and its procedures, 
nonetheless understand that their functions are guided by the legal premise that the Court, 
rather than seeking out guilt from the general population, instead is attracted by guilt. In a 
                                                          
18 Agamben (2011), p 23. 
19 ‘Kafka’s use of the subjunctive hätte in the opening sentence has huge implications for the rest of 
the novel. It suggests that K.’s innocence is not an objective fact but a subjective claim, possibly made 
by K. himself’: Duttlinger (2013), p 58. We get a sense of the inherent susceptibility of this subjective 
viewpoint from the character sketch of a ‘Joseph K.’ in a diary entry of 29 July 1914, in which K., 
accused by his employer of theft, declares his innocence (‘It’s a mistake or a slander!’) before 
conceding, somewhat perplexedly, his commission of the crime: Kafka (1976), pp 297-298. 
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similar vein, the merchant Block will refer to the superstitious belief that the outcome of the 
trial can be predicted from the defendant’s face, an imminent conviction being intuited in K’s 
case by the tired and distracted people waiting in the court. This apparent reversal of 
causation—the law passively connecting itself to a pre-established guilt—imposes upon K. 
the duty of actively engaging with the accusation, one which he insouciantly evades, but also 
which comes to dominate his daily life. K.’s response, alerting to his ignorance of the law and 
in a futile attempt to gain a strategic advantage over his interlocutors, establishes a pattern 
that marks his indolent approach to the case against him. Later, K.’s uncle, reproaching K. for 
his apparent indifference, alludes to the foregone conclusion of guilt that passivity breeds: 
“that’s not how an innocent man acts who still has his strength.”20 Indeed, K. himself 
acknowledges that the truth of the accusation is of subsidiary importance, actually irrelevant, 
to the crucial issues: the identity of the accuser and the authorities animating the proceedings. 
The inspector’s retort reaffirms the subjective and tenuous basis of the truth of the slander: in 
the first place, the very existence of an accusation remains a supposition of K.’s invention, of 
which the lower-level official cannot presume to know; in the second place, K’s belief in or 
protestation of innocence could only serve to negatively influence the inferences to be drawn 
from his behaviour, which, impliedly, would form the central basis of the Court’s assessment. 
Throughout these early scenes there is little indication that K. is preoccupied with the 
injustice of the slander, at least to the extent that it would transcend the sense of shame and 
humiliation produced by the fact of the allegation and the mode of its delivery. Certainly, any 
such concerns are put paid to not long after the meeting with the lawyer, when K. exhorts 
himself to move beyond the initial contempt displayed for the trial and to adopt a more 
strategic approach to his defence, resolving “to reject the notion of any possible guilt right 
                                                          
20 Kafka (1998a), p 92. 
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from the start.”21 We might suggest, then, that the starting point for The Trial, and for 
understanding the significance of its opening, is the subversion of this “a prioriness of 
guilt,”22 its interiority and its necessary connection with the law. 
 Milan Kundera suggests that Kafka’s ironical treatment of “guilt,” in the form of the 
inducement of guilt, may be mapped through the character of K. in accordance with five 
stages. In the first, “acting guilty without being so” introduces a humiliating element which 
K. struggles in futility to overcome. In the second, K.’s stance of superiority before the 
examining magistrate, leading to his refusal to accede to an interrogation, reveals itself as 
mere pretence when he finds it to have been taken seriously and proceeds to seek out another 
audience with the court. In the third, the trial is socialized: “Society has already adopted the 
accusation and added the weight of its tacit approval (or its nondisagreement).” The fourth 
sees K. searching for the crime himself, and within himself, to ratify the accusation whose 
truth has never been questioned. The fifth stage coincides with the supposed final scene: K.’s 
identification with his executioner.23 It is at this point that K.’s resolve to maintain a sense of 
dignity (equated with being calm and analytical) in order to see the trial through to the end on 
his own terms, ironically leads to cooperation and compliance with his escorts, even active 
assistance in evading the policemen, while the inability to fulfil his duty to seize the knife and 
use it upon himself resonates with the shame which inevitably outlives him.  
Of course, it cannot be ignored that the staging of the final scenes bears no 
resemblance to the conventional formalities of a State-sponsored execution. K., in solemn 
dress and expectant, receives the guests whose visit had not been heralded. The 
                                                          
21 The passage continues: ‘There was no guilt. The trial was no different than a major business 
deal…in which, as was customary, various dangers lurked that must be avoided’: Kafka (1998a), p 
125. 
22 Deleuze and Guattari, (1986), p 43. 
23 Kundera (2001), pp 206-11. 
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“executioners,” in their peculiar attire of frock coats and top hats, never reveal their status, 
functions or purpose, while their clumsy manner and comic appearance conjure the image of 
“old supporting actors” rather than officers of the court. In the end, it is neither the court nor 
the executioners who pronounce the verdict – the verdict is K.’s alone, which the men lean in 
towards his face to observe. There is good reason to consider the final scene as “more an act 
of torture gone awry than an execution.”24 Viewed in this light, there is an unmistakable 
parallel to the events in the short story In the Penal Colony. The condemned man, knowing 
neither the fact of being sentenced nor the nature of the sentence, is to be executed via a 
machine whose function is to inscribe the violated law into his flesh until he is able to 
decipher the text. In principle, the harrow and its controlling scriber operate as an instrument 
of torture, with judgment complete only once the condemned man’s wounds reveal to him the 
truth of his transgression. In the end, however, the mechanical process disintegrates, and the 
torture of the officer (who has replaced the accused man as the instrument’s subject) gives 
way to his murder. Neither has the truth being deciphered, nor justice being carried out, while 
the intrinsic principle that “guilt is invariably beyond doubt” finds its contorted application in 
the facial expression on the officer’s corpse – “It was just as it had been in life, with no sign 
of the promised deliverance.”25   
 Here, punishment functions according to a different logic. No longer tied to guilt, it 
represents a dual movement. On the one hand, it effects the law’s subjectification of the 
individual through the process of producing judgment; thus, punishment fulfils the singular 
requirement of judgment, the conflation of the legal process with the sentence. On the other 
hand, punishment appears as the ‘last machination of the machine of necessity the law has 
                                                          
24 Agamben (2011), p 29. 
25 Kafka (1981), pp 155, 176. 
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become,’26 and it is precisely in the necessity of the legal order that the question of justice 
assumes a marginal role. We shall consider each of these themes in turn. 
  
B. Between Justice and Judgment  
“And yet in the darkness he now sees a radiance that streams forth inextinguishably 
from the door of the Law.”27  
Many of Kafka’s references to law and legal authority are framed by spatial metaphors. The 
use of spatial imagery goes beyond mere context and aesthetics; it is also strategic in a critical 
sense. We can observe this in a couple of ways. Firstly, the spaces in which the protagonists 
find themselves often resist conventional depictions and associations – for example, the 
official and bureaucratic merge with the domiciliary – producing a disorienting effect for 
both the protagonist and the reader, and challenging any assumed situational certainty. In the 
short story Advocates the first-person narrator is seen wandering through labyrinthine 
corridors: narrow, austerely vaulted and sparsely decorated, seemingly created for profound 
silence, more akin to a library or museum than the law courts, but also sullied by the large, 
aproned bodies of the old women who incessantly come and go. At first glance, this is an 
incongruous place in which to seek advocates; but it is precisely the informal, arbitrary 
elements of the law, within which “all is accusation, advocacy and verdict,”28 which 
necessitate the intervention of advocates that should be found anywhere, especially outside of 
the official setting. In a similar vein, the sites of authority in The Trial remain indistinct from 
the familiar, parochial world, creating an ambivalence that presumedly unsettles K.. The 
inspector who formally informs K. of his arrest sets up office in the bedroom of a fellow 
                                                          
26 Glen (2007), p 63. 
27 Kafka (1998a), p 216. 
28 Kafka (1971), p 498. 
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lodger within the boardinghouse, a white blouse hanging from the window, the nightstand 
utilised as a desk. The offices of the court of inquiry before which K.’s initial interrogation is 
to take place are on the top floor of a non-descript building among tall, grey apartment houses 
in a poor residential area. The attic-like room into which K. is ushered by a woman washing 
diapers in the antechamber is hazy and dark, crowded with men in formal black coats and a 
gallery of shabbily-dressed people. Upon returning to the court room on the following 
Sunday, he discovers that the offices, now characterised by a “sordid emptiness,” also serve 
as the living quarters of the washerwoman and her husband, a court usher, when the court is 
not in session. The old, dusty and decrepit books sitting on the table that had been used by the 
examining magistrate suggest salacious reading material rather than legal texts. Even the 
studio of the painter Titorelli, a miserable, claustrophobic room furnished only with a bed and 
easel, is part of the court’s offices, for “There are law court offices in practically every 
attic.”29 In these depictions, the public, ceremonial, sanctioned spaces one associates with the 
magisterial elements of legal authority are instead represented by confined, slatternly, even 
indecent, domestic spaces. Just as the question of innocence cannot be discerned through a 
legal lens, since guilt is already absorbed by the slanderous accusation, it is not possible to 
distinguish between what does and does not belong to the realm of the law, since the judicial 
authorities appear omnipresent – a corporeal, mundane and sordid presence – though 
ultimately elusive. 
 In another sense, Kafka portrays the individual’s relation to the law in terms of a 
spatial distance or divide that cannot be exhausted or breached. This is achieved through the 
idea of a repetitive, endless striving to reach a destination that is in any case uncertain. In 
Advocates the corridors merely lead to further corridors, with more flights of stairs leading to 
                                                          
29 Kafka (1998a), p 164. 
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more floors – “As long as you don’t stop climbing, the stairs won’t end.”30 Similarly, the 
parable recounted in The Great Wall of China31 speaks of a messenger entrusted with a 
message of incomparable importance by the dying Emperor, but in order deliver that message 
the messenger would need to cross the palace, descend stairs and traverse the courts, only to 
find a second outer palace and more stairs and courts, leading to another set, and so on, a task 
that would consume thousands of years. Even if reaching the outermost gate, the messenger 
would then be confronted with the imperial capital, whose density no one could possibly 
penetrate. However, it is in the legend recounted by the priest in the Cathedral chapter of The 
Trial that we come across the most developed form of this metaphor. Its first three words, 
“Before the Law,” set up a spatial relationship between the man from the country and the 
Law to which he futilely seeks admittance. It is a relationship defined by a series of 
obstructions or limitations. First, the man is only ever before the law, never within or outside. 
The law is treated simultaneously as a place to which one desires access and a beyond 
inscribed with the impossibility of a traverse. Thus, the man from the country is in a strange 
and paradoxical situation “where from the moment he wants to enter in the law, he is not 
there. In order not to transgress the law, he has to remain in the immobile situation before the 
law.”32 Second, the only true interaction between the man and the law is through the 
doorkeeper who forbids entry. The man exhausts his days with his entreaties towards and 
study of the doorkeeper, but the doorkeeper, whose singularity lies in his indifference, merely 
fulfils his duty, while all of the assumptions about the law (its universal accessibility, that all 
strive to reach it, that no one else has requested admittance) are of the man’s own making. 
Indeed, that the entrance was meant solely for the man from the country implies that the 
                                                          
30 Kafka (1971), p 499. 
31 Kafka (1971), pp 275-76. 
32 Cixous (1991), p 30. 
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existence of the doorkeeper is also entirely dependent on the man’s desire for access. Third, 
the entrance to the law is guarded by a potentially interminable number of doorkeepers of 
increasing power, the sight alone of the third doorkeeper being unbearable. This echoes the 
painter’s distinction between the judges on the lowest levels, which are known but do not 
have the power to grant a final acquittal, with those of the highest court, in which the power 
resides but which are totally inaccessible to everyone. Again, the image of an incessantly and 
endlessly protracted path suggests the ultimate elusiveness of the law, without diminishing 
the very possibility of the task to which both the entrance and its doorkeeper attest. Hence the 
necessity of the man’s relationship to the law – the desire for admittance is as perennial as the 
temporal and spatial distance to that which lies beyond the entrance. 
 In essence, the law is presented through the aporetic relation between an exterior and 
interior. It is aporetic in a conceptual sense, since the only certainty that exists is the space 
between the two, within which the man from the country is perpetually suspended. Both the 
man and the doorkeeper, albeit differentially, may be deceived as to whether there is anything 
beyond the entrance, thus whether there is an interior at all. The only experience which the 
man has of what exists beyond the door is the “radiance” that pierces the darkness that has 
enveloped him, while the simpleminded doorkeeper may not in fact know the interior of the 
law, merely “the path he constantly patrols back and forth before it.”33 As Cixous suggests, 
the absence of an interior is the law’s secret: there is no material inside, for the law that 
prohibits is also itself prohibited. The “monstrous opening without inside” renders the law 
both “a step and its annulment;” the entrance is nothing more than the step the man did not 
take. 34 Such an impasse can only be escaped through the question of the origin of the law, 
                                                          
33 Kafka (1998a), p 220. 
34 Cixous (1991), pp 33-34. 
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defeating the assumption that it has always existed. It is this question of the law’s origin – 
and by corollary, of the possibility of justice – which seems to recur within Kafka’s texts.  
 The question is also taken up in the parable The Problem of Our Laws, describing a 
society whose laws are the privy and privilege of a select group of governing nobles. The 
problem to which the title refers is predicated upon the fact that the laws are not generally 
known. In turn, they are sustained by a number of presumptions: that the laws are ancient, 
thus inherently protected by a veritable tradition; that the laws are “scrupulously 
administered;” that the nobles have no cause to interpret the laws out of personal interest 
inimical to the general population since from the beginning they were made to the advantage 
of those to whom they were entrusted; and finally, that the laws actually exist. It appears, 
then, that the question “who doubts the wisdom of the ancient laws?”35 is doubly rhetorical: 
the wisdom of ancient laws cannot be doubted, administered and interpreted as they are by 
those who stand above them, but it is this very characteristic which ultimately remains in 
doubt. Neither the popular belief that the laws are a mystery exclusively confided to the 
nobility, nor the opposing, marginally-held view that the laws do not actually exist, can 
remove the paradox produced by the fact that any repudiation of belief in the legitimacy of 
the laws – a necessary task in order to gain knowledge and control of the laws and avoid 
arbitrary rule – would entail a repudiation of the “sole visible and indubitable law” which 
binds the society, the nobility itself.  
 There is a cogent argument for interpreting these parables as a critique of the 
formalistic elements of legal positivism, at least of the type found in early twentieth-century 
Austro-German jurisprudence.36 “The text is immutable” the priest declares, while the 
                                                          
35 Kafka (1971), p 482. 
36 On a biographical note, Arnold Heidsieck suggests the influence upon Kafka of the ideas of the 
German legal philosopher Oskar Kraus, who ‘maintained that both jurisprudence and practical 
adjudication must seek a balance between literal adherence to codified civil law and the constant 
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narrator in Advocates surmises that life would not be possible were judgment not passed in 
accordance with law: “one must have confidence that the court allows the majesty of the law 
its full scope, for this is its sole duty,”37 which is as much to say that it is crucial to have faith 
in “the nobility and its right to go on living,”38 for the alternative would be to deprive oneself 
of the only certainty that law can offer. The illusoriness of legal positivism derives from the 
fact that, within its own terms, legal legitimacy rests upon constructed authority. Yet, 
authority, the foundation and basis for positing law, is by its very definition without 
foundation, resting upon no authority other than itself.39 Any attempt to rationalise the 
legitimacy of laws based on a positivist paradigm inevitably runs up against this axiomatic 
principle. In Kafka’s texts legal positivism’s claim to authenticity is counterposed to the 
fundamentally deceptive nature of this self-rationalised legitimacy. The doorkeeper, the law’s 
agent, as much as the man from the country, stands in ignorance of the law; each in his own 
way is separated from the law and exists in a state of deception – the man cannot enter though 
the entrance was meant solely for him, while the doorkeeper is bound to his post though his 
duty is no more than an empty formality. Neither has access to the law, and neither can do 
anything but stand before it – a predicament reminiscent of that of the poet in Hӧlderlin’s 
poem Timidity: “nothing awaits him but motionless existence, complete passivity, which is 
the essence of the courageous man – nothing except to surrender himself wholly to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
consideration of distributive justice and natural-law principles:’ Heidsieck, ‘The Fictional or Non-
Fictional Uses of Administrative, Civil, and Criminal Law by Kafka and his Friends,’ 
http://www.usc.edu/dept/LAS/german/track/heidsiec/KafkaLawsources/KafkaLawsources.pdf. 
37 Kafka (1971), p 498. 
38 Kafka (1971) p 483. 
39 Derrida (2002), p 242. 
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relationship.”40  This remains the inescapable truth of the law’s authority, but an authority 
based on what?  
Minkkinen proposes a reading sympathetic with Nietzsche’s thesis on the ‘will to 
power’. Given that the very notion of an authority to create laws assumes a higher rule of law 
that both legitimates the authority and conditions its use, the function of legitimacy is 
undermined by its own promise. With Nietzsche’s reversal of the relationship between a 
command and its legitimacy, the rule of law and justice, far from being foundational precepts 
that shape the quality of laws, are only ever the reflections of a commanding will, the 
expressions of the will to power.41 That justice is subjected to and conditioned by the positing 
of laws implies, beyond the apparent and facile reversal of roles, a fundamental rethinking of 
the conceptual relationship between justice and judgment. 
As Derrida notes, “To be invested with its categorical authority, the law must be 
without history, genesis, or any possible derivation.”42 With legal positivism the question of 
the law’s origin is chronically displaced in favour of a recurring performative act: the law’s 
legitimacy is proclaimed and reified by the very act of the law being in force, and through 
each act by which it declares right. The Problem of Our Laws suggests that laws based on 
constructed authority create and are nourished by tradition, a tradition of interpretation and 
application. Thus, while it can be said that history comes into the service of positive law, it 
does so as an aid to interpretation (and corresponding reification) rather than as a function of 
its derivation, since the law’s claim to legitimacy is fundamentally ahistorical. When the 
priest states the opinion that no one has the right to pass judgment on the doorkeeper, his 
being the servant of the law and thus detached from human judgment, it is implicit that the 
                                                          
40 Benjamin (2002a), p 34. 
41 Minkkinen (1994), pp 359-360. 
42 Derrida (1992), p 191. 
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divide between man and the law, which ultimately furnishes the latter with immunity from 
scrutiny of its foundation, supplies legal positivism with the basis for its rationality.  
What, then, can be made of the inextinguishable light from the door? Does Kafka 
suggest that justice through the law may be possible? Gunther Teubner offers two possible 
readings: one would situate justice in the experience of the man before the doorkeeper, a 
“patient, self-tormenting, humiliating confrontation;” the other would locate it within the 
“collective imagination of the legal discourse” that seeks to penetrate through to the law. 
Should the light be seen as an illumination of law that connotes the possibility of justice, 
however refracted and slight, as an inextinguishable force, evoking an enduring biblical 
metaphor, or does the recognition of the possibility of the man’s eyes being deceived imply 
that it is all simply an illusion, that the endless waiting and the singularity of the entrance 
which is to be closed merely conceal the law’s emptiness? The latter would preclude any 
instrumental value to law as a means of achieving justice. As Robert Bolt has Thomas More 
declare, “The law is not a 'light' for you or any man to see by; the law is not an instrument of 
any kind.”43 Teubner is surely correct to conclude that ambivalence on this question is 
unavoidable, lacking as we do the criteria for distinguishing between a collective imagination 
of justice and a collective self-deception.44 What remains clear, though, is that the passivity 
implicated in being before the law is marked by a contradictory set of duties, to obey the law 
(since entry is forbidden) and to breach it (in order to access), a “double bind” that provides 
the man with absolute freedom and at the same time “entangles him in permanent guilt.”45 
“[I]t’s often better to be in chains than to be free,”46 K.’s lawyer explains, alluding to the 
                                                          
43 Bolt (2013), p 97. 
44 Teubner (2013), p 420. 
45 Teubner (2013), p 414. 
46 Kafka (1998a), p 190. 
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oppressive nature of the freedom that is the condition of the accused. Contrary to the 
assumptions of liberal ideology, it is the law that creates freedom rather than law being 
produced by the exercise of free will. The freedom that law creates is ipso facto subject to the 
law, a juridical construct or fiction, if you will, and thus inherently circumscribed. As the 
nonhuman narrator in A Report for an Academy reflects, men are often betrayed or duped by 
the idea of freedom; “as freedom is among the most sublime of feelings, so is the 
corresponding illusion among the most sublime.”47 The illusion of freedom is also a thematic 
undercurrent in The Castle, defining K.’s relationship with the authorities. As the Castle itself 
becomes increasingly tenebrous and chimerical to K. (its contours “already beginning to 
dissolve”), his quest to access and receive recognition of his purpose from its officials leaves 
him waiting in vain, and while his right to stay in an otherwise forbidden place provides him 
with a newfound freedom, he feels “as if there were nothing more senseless, nothing more 
desperate, than this freedom, this waiting, this invulnerability.”48  The legal space of freedom 
is created precisely through the paradox of prohibition, and therefore is annulled by the 
contradiction of self-restraint: you are free to do so, but with your freedom you must ensure 
that you do not. Derrida expresses it thus: “The law is prohibited. But this contradictory self-
prohibition allows man the freedom of self-determination, even though this freedom cancels 
itself through the self-prohibition of entering the law.”49 If justice exists as potentiality, it is 
not obvious that for Kafka it is to be found in positive law and its institutions.  
The essence of the trial is process, as the semantics of the German title for the novel 
(Der Process) suggest. And as is insinuated throughout the novel, the legal process is 
inexhaustible. The trial is not a set of proceedings that can ever be concluded, a position 
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which indeed may be reflected in the inconclusive character of Kafka’s “unfinished” novel.50 
The painter makes this clear when he explains to K. that the two possible outcomes of the 
trial – apparent acquittal and protraction – share the purpose of preventing a final 
determination, whether conviction or actual acquittal. Apparent acquittal is marked by the 
“ceaseless routine of the court offices,” with the active file always susceptible to being 
resumed and initiating a further arrest and proceedings, while protraction, which stalls the 
case at its first instance, ensures that the interrogations and examinations will continue to be 
conducted without the promise of finality. 51 We might suggest, then, that the relationship 
between law and judgment is at once teleological and homologous. In a teleological sense, 
the law is solely directed towards judgment, rather than justice or truth – “the ultimate aim of 
law is the production of a res judicata, in which the sentence becomes the substitute for the 
true and the just.”52 By the same token, the protracted nature of the trial process places in 
doubt any conceptual divide between law and judgment. “[P]ostponement is the hope of the 
accused man only if the proceedings do not gradually turn into the judgment,”53 a hope which 
the priest disconcertingly quashes. This is the enigma of the law-judgment relation. The law 
serves to produce judgment, while judgment absorbs the trial process and fulfils itself only in 
perpetuity, as the very process of judging, without the possibility of deliverance. When the 
priest concludes that “The court wants nothing from you. It receives you when you come and 
dismisses you when you go,”54 he is not merely confirming the painter’s sober revelation of 
                                                          
50 ‘But as the trial, according to the author’s own statement made by word of mouth, was never to get 
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the futility of seeking an actual acquittal (a delusive, if mystical, goal, as suggested by the 
final verdicts of past cases being accessible only through legends); he is also remarking that 
the juridical process, which begins with the accusation, inevitably ends with judgment, not as 
a means of establishing innocence or guilt, nor for the purpose of punishing transgressions, 
but as the end in itself.55 This, in a schematic sense, is the message behind the pictorial 
representation of Justice and the goddess of Victory combined in the same person.56 As 
Agamben goes on to explain, the self-referential nature of judgment has been disguised 
through the conceptual confusion between morality and law. The conventional understanding 
of responsibility as a radically moral idea that gives rise to the application of law in the 
pursuit of justice (as evidenced especially in the discourses surrounding the judgments in the 
Nuremberg trials) ignores the historical contamination of moral principles by juridical 
concepts. Responsibility, like guilt, is fundamentally a juridical rather than moral category – 
it is tied to the notion of culpa or fault, the “imputability of damage,” and thus properly 
belongs to the law rather than the subjective interiority of ethics.57  
We have observed, through Kafka’s parabolic representation of the law, that law 
operates at a purely formalistic level, and is ultimately lacking foundation; that legal 
positivism is irremediably marked by the relational absence of an interior. For Kafka, then, 
the possibility of justice is conditioned by the functional manifestation of the law as juridical 
process, in which the freedom necessary for the exercise of justice reveals itself as mere 
illusion. As Banaker notes, a paradox ‘lies at the heart of the relationship between modern 
law, which strives towards generality and universality, and justice, which requires the 
                                                          
55 ‘One can even say that the whole punishment is in the judgment, that the action characteristic of 
punishment – incarceration, execution – matters only insofar as it is, so to speak, the carrying out of 
the judgment:’ Satta, Il mistero del processo (Adelphi, Milan, 1994), p 26, cited in Agamben (2008), 
p 19. 
56 See Kafka (1998a), p 145. 
57 See Agamben (2008), pp 20-24. 
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recognition of singularity and specificity.’58 For Kafka, the paradox can be observed precisely 
in the law’s functioning, where the non-rational aspects of the law are sustained by the 
inherent rationality of its process, thus the law’s preoccupation with judgment. As we shall 
discover, this critique of law’s formalism implicates, subjectively, a relation of necessity and 
immanence between the individual and the legal order, most lucidly depicted in the 
situational subjection of Kafka’s characters.  
  
C. Subjection, Necessity, Immanence 
A related theme in Kafka’s legal references is that of the immanence and necessity of the 
legal order within which all of the characters circulate and to which they are inextricably 
bound. “Everything belongs to the court,”59 the painter explains, and though said partly in 
jest, the idea resonates with the observations we have already made regarding the 
representation of the law’s spatial presence in Kafka’s stories. K.’s lawyer refers to the court 
and its proceedings as a “vast judicial organism”60 existing “in a state of eternal equilibrium,” 
such that any disturbance would be compensated for in order for the organism to remain 
unchanged, if not rendered more resolute, vigilant and malicious.61 And the priest, in 
reference to the dignity to be accorded to the doorkeeper by virtue of his legal appointment, 
retorts that “you don’t have to consider everything true, you just have to consider it 
necessary.”62 The law speaks through and acts by necessity. If there is any degree of 
realisation or awakening on the part of K. from his involvement in the legal process, it is 
                                                          
58 Banakar (2010), p 480. 
59 Kafka (1998a), p 150. 
60 Similarly, in The Castle the official organization is described as ‘a great living organization’ whose 
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61 Kafka (1998a), p 119-120. 
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perhaps regarding this point. He appears to recognise that deception remains the law’s modus 
operandi with his disconsolate reply that “Lies are made into a universal system,” but it 
cannot be his final judgment for he is so overcome by weariness as to be unable to take in all 
of its consequences.63 
According to Hannah Arendt, the law’s deception is what mobilises the judicial 
machine for the sake of necessity, the latter defined by its sublimity and automatism. The 
priest, as prison chaplain, is the ultimate representative of this order: his defence of the 
system by way of a legend and its interpretations (a narrative form which, by definition, blurs 
the distinctions between myth and history, fable and fact), attests to his role as guardian of an 
order at once mystical and immanent, a role reminiscent of the archaic figure of the jurist-
priest in Roman and Medieval societies. His words “reveal the secret theology and the deep 
faith of bureaucrats to be a faith in necessity as such, and the bureaucrats end up as the 
functionaries of necessity.”64 The deception (the injustice, stigmatization and humiliation) of 
the man from the country – and in parallel, of K. himself – is “both denied and endlessly 
repeated because it is seen as ‘necessary’ for the order of the world.”65 This is presented 
metaphorically in the progressive darkening of the cathedral, with K. effectively lost in the 
darkness.  
 The notion of subjection to a state or situation that is considered to be necessary 
resounds through many of Kafka’s stories. The jackals in Jackals and Arabs move as though 
animated “at the dictate of a whip,” the consequence of an ancient blood feud underwritten by 
ancient law.66 As with the secretive laws entrusted to the nobles in The Problem of Our Laws, 
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or the laws that do not resemble any known to K. in The Trial, the ancient law, assuming the 
form of a canonical tradition, becomes an ineluctable social force that creates and justifies 
relations of subjection. Out of tradition necessity is born and its historical conditions 
forgotten. While the jackals attempt to extricate themselves from the feud by urging the 
European explorer to exterminate their foe, they ultimately remain bound to the chief Arab’s 
whip, as though circus animals playing their part. “The point is to describe people who act as 
though ‘under the law (Gesetz) of a whip’ and perhaps, even, under the whip of a law.”67 A 
similar dynamic can be gleaned from some of the interpersonal relationships in Kafka’s 
stories. In The Metamorphosis, Gregor’s unexplained transformation into a giant insect sees 
him endure incompassion and increasing cruelty by his family members, their final decision 
to rid themselves of him being fatefully accepted and even endorsed by Gregor: “The 
decision that he must disappear was one that he held to even more strongly than his sister, if 
that were possible.”68  Similarly, in The Judgment we witness the protagonist willingly 
subjecting himself to a verdict that seems inescapable. As Georg’s interaction with his father 
gradually disintegrates into resentment and dubitable accusations against him, his father 
charts the inevitable course of his son’s life, from “innocent child” to “devilish human 
being,”69 before pronouncing his death sentence. Ironically, given that the son is destroyed 
not by the power and aggression wielded by his father but “by the emotional bond which ties 
him to [his] parents” and thereby eliminates resistance,70 Georg declares his love for his 
parents as he allows himself to fall into the water. Louis Begley notes, in relation to the 
fathers who kill or banish sons who transgress in Kafka’s stories, that the sons do not fight 
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back – “They do not all, like Georg, rush to become their own executioners, but, without 
exception, they submit to the punishment.”71 
 There is a recurring connection between physical and symbolic violence in Kafka’s 
texts.72 Even in a story such as In the Penal Colony, in which the description of physical 
violence is both prosaic and incisive, the spectre of symbolic domination and violence is 
pervasive. The colonial setting, the significance of military discipline to social order, the 
conflict between opposing ideologies in relation to the function and severity of punishment – 
these elements of the narrative each contribute to an analysis of the nature of authority, legal 
tradition, judicial power and the culture of obedience. Of equal significance and 
effectiveness, however, is the device of the apparently disinterested foreigner, through whose 
objective lens much of the critique of the colonial penal system passes, to portray the more 
insidious forms of domination and submission. The traveller’s antipathy towards the cruel 
punitive methods advocated by the zealous officer – “The injustice of the procedure and the 
inhumanity of the execution were beyond doubt73 – is tempered by a soundly-reasoned 
reticence to intervene in the affairs of a country to which he does not belong. The traveller 
fails to stop the officer’s self-imposed torture and execution, even as he witnesses the 
disintegration of the machine, but also actively prevents the soldier and the condemned man 
(now nominally free) from escaping their incarceration on the island. The distinguished 
foreigner’s enlightened views on criminal justice and corresponding humane sentiment are 
overwhelmed by a concern, indeed a responsibility, to not disturb the order of things, to 
respect the extant system of authority despite its decay and impending transformation, just as 
he feels the power of an earlier age in the old colony’s buildings notwithstanding their state 
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of disrepair. Despite the ideological differences, there is, in effect, a fundamental continuum 
among the condemned man (who submits to his punishment in ignorance), the officer (who 
submits to tradition by supporting the old commandant’s legacy), and the traveller (who 
acquiesces in the barbaric injustice from the privileged perspective of the rational, 
dispassionate observer, proving himself to be just as powerless to resist as the others).  
An analogous scene in The Trial has K. rationalising his decision to ignore the 
requests for intervention from the guards who are to be punished as a consequence of K’s 
report to the examining magistrate. The flogger’s conviction that “their punishment is as just 
as it is inevitable” is effectively sanctioned through K.’s capitulation – though he is 
tormented by not having prevented the flogging – as the threat to his reputation from being 
observed in such a predicament convinces him that no one “could really demand such a 
sacrifice from him.”74 Once again, the question of justice is marginalised by the (historical) 
relations of power that situate individuals in seemingly inexorable conditions in which their 
compliance is a matter of course.75 Moreover, the law in Kafka’s world “feeds on hierarchy 
and difference” while undermining the boundaries and distinctions that serve as their 
foundations. “[W]hat separates the holders of powers from their inferiors becomes blurred,” 
such that “even the most deeply fallen can abruptly regain their terrible power, and in the 
same way, the accused can become the accuser.”76  
 According to Calasso, the most persuasive gloss on the parable Before the Law is 
Kafka’s own in the form of The Castle,77 pointing to the semblance between the man from the 
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country’s relationship to the Law and the visiting land surveyor’s relationship to the Castle. 
While the law in The Trial functions by way of prohibitions and judicial procedures, and the 
Castle by way of regulations and administrative practices, they have in common the 
representation of power as immanence. This form of representation relies upon a particular 
conception of the law which owes little to either (juridical) sovereignty or (theological) 
transcendence. Indeed, within Kafka’s fiction the law is never depicted as a system – which 
would implicate a structure or organisation based upon constitutive principles, including of 
rights and of justice – rather, the law is experienced through rules, and invariably via the 
agents entrusted with their application. Rules supplant the majestic (thus supra-juridical) 
elements of the law by a logic of regularity, process and administration: 
Rules also suppress the rights which go along with the notion of law, and establish the 
reign of pure procedure which – a manifestation of technical competence, of sheer 
knowledge – invests everything, controls everything, submits every gesture to its 
administration, so that there is no longer any possibility of liberation, for one can no 
longer speak of oppression.78 
Further, the relation of immanence connotes the state of being both intrinsic and omnipresent, 
but in a strategically quotidian sense. The power of the Castle lies with “the way it invades 
the lives of individuals even in their most intimate moments.”79 In both The Trial and The 
Castle formal distinctions between the public, the official and the private spheres are 
constantly eroded. In the former, Josef K. attempts in vain to maintain some separation of his 
private and business life from the official proceedings, whereas the court penetrates all 
aspects of his daily existence, and the law, in its realisation as judgment, ultimately affirms 
itself through the very body of K. In the latter, by contrast, K. actively seeks to integrate his 
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life with that of the village (which is merely the property of the Castle) in his pursuit of an 
acknowledgment from the Castle authorities of his appointment and justification for his 
presence. In both cases, however, the power exercised by the authorities is coextensive with 
the lives of the individuals who are subject to it.  For Kafka, the human is effaced by the 
immanence of power. The individuals that circulate around the court or the village only exist 
through their relationship to the authorities, and genuinely lack an autonomous identity. This 
is arguably reflected in the minimalistic portrayal of the characters, who are invariably 
abstract, incomplete and occasionally surreal. In this regard, Arendt suggests that the 
protagonists consider themselves distinct from society since their role is “utterly 
indeterminate,” while the incidental characters “do not exhibit any psychological features 
because they simply do not exist outside of their roles, positions, and occupations.”80 In a 
similar tone, Benjamin discerns in the activities of the assistants or messengers which 
populate Kafka’s stories “the Law that reigns, in an oppressive and gloomy way, over this 
whole groups of creatures,” none of which has “firm inalienable outlines.”81  
 Kafka’s effacement of the human becomes one of the points of departure for 
Agamben’s thesis on the interrelationship between law and human (bare) life that 
characterises sovereign power. There are two main aspects to the logic of this thesis. The first 
concerns the ontology of the human being, which is radically divided between the human 
(speaking being, logos, subjectification) and the inhuman (living being, desubjectification).82 
This division between the speaking being and the living being, the human and the animal, is 
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the decisive political conflict in Western culture, and the basis for all other conflicts.83 We 
can trace this ontology to Kafka’s treatment of subjectivity. In his extensive menagerie of 
characters – including animals intruding into the human world (The Metamorphosis), animals 
co-existing with humans (Jackals and Arabs, A Report for an Academy) and animal narrators 
with human psychologies but circumscribed by their natural environment (Investigations of a 
Dog, The Burrow) – the differences between humanity and animality are neither fixed nor 
determinative. Moreover, the figures that submit to necessity, as an exercise of their 
paradoxical freedom, epitomise the contradiction of divided being: as subject, they embody 
both subjection and sovereignty; this double movement, of subjectification and 
desubjectification, is the fundamental condition of shame, the subject’s becoming witness to 
its own oblivion as subject.84 Josef K.’s final words during his execution, “Like a dog!” aptly 
expresses the shame that will survive his annihilation. Agamben’s Kafka is the writer who 
has done most to renounce the theodical concerns of guilt and freedom in favour of the 
redemptive figure of shame; as Salzani lucidly expresses it, ‘Shame as a privileged – and 
revolutionary – opening to subjectivization and to the inner self, and thus as a possibility for a 
new, post-biopolitical ethics.’85 
 The second concerns the politicisation of life through the state of exception: “Law 
that becomes indistinguishable from life in a real state of exception is confronted by life that, 
in a symmetrical but inverse gesture, is entirely transformed into law.”86 The state of 
exception is one in which it is “impossible to distinguish transgression of the law from 
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execution of the law,” where violation of the law and conformity with it coincide.87 This 
dilemma or paradox of the law may be observed in many aspects of the relationships between 
individuals and the authorities in Kafka’s texts. Much of the way in which the court operates 
in The Trial may be classified as extra-legal or exceptional: indictments and evidence that are 
not made known, hearings that occur outside of formal processes, secret punishments in 
private, execution without verdict and judgment. Yet, there is never any doubt cast upon the 
legitimacy and legal force of these functions and acts, and all of the characters either fulfil 
their official roles dutifully or accept the validity of even seemingly arbitrary rules and 
practices. The exceptional becomes the norm by virtue of the “indistinguishability” between 
law and life. For Agamben, Kafka’s law is the pure form of law that neither prescribes nor 
signifies, but remains in force, its very openness maintaining life in its grasp, as the man from 
the country remains paralysed before an open door destined for him. The sovereign relation 
that characterises the state of exception functions in accordance with the ‘relation of 
inclusionary exclusion or exclusionary inclusion in which the law keeps life in its power by 
excluding life from law’s domain.’88 Moreover, Agamben reads Kafka’s account of law as 
admitting the possibility of justice, not in the overturning or ‘erasure’ of law but in its 
‘deactivation and inactivity’, the potential other uses of the law that are available beyond its 
formal suspension.89  
 
D. Literature as Legal Critique  
Though we have only presented a minor interrogation of a seemingly inexhaustible field, it is 
patent that the legacy of Kafka’s writing – and the now vast interpretive canon surrounding it 
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– for legal critique is significant. “Literature is the place of contradictions and disputations” 
Blanchot writes,90 and it is this pronounced feature which best explains the value of Kafka’s 
juridico-political observations.  Kafka’s literary explorations of the law and its institutional 
manifestation in the lives of individuals offer an aesthetico-critical method with which to 
understand the ways in which the law functions and justifies itself through discourse.  Such a 
method avoids some of the limitations of theoretical approaches to legal critique – by which 
is meant those seeking to establish a theory that accounts for law’s rationality – precisely 
because it does not purport to explain the rational basis for the law, but instead challenges its 
assumed systematicity and questions what is at stake in this rationality. What renders it an 
especially useful, critical method is its ability to expose the reader to the paradoxes, 
inconsistencies and absence in the law through a direct engagement or experience with its 
“contradictions and disputations.” Within the constraints of academic disciplines, legal theory 
struggles to account for the non-rational elements of legal practice, or the “particular excesses 
of legal ambivalence” – by contrast, literature allows “the possibility for the paradoxes of the 
Law to be experienced.”91  
 There is, perhaps, in Kafka a relationship of continuity between literature and legal 
critique. Each strives to express the inexpressible, the impossible. To be more precise, each 
confronts the limitation inherent in the fact that any use of language to understand how things 
are risks becoming the object of its analysis, from which there is no escape but merely an 
endless repetition. Literature is this struggle to grant language some significance without 
undermining the edifice that is thereby constructed. This may, in part, explain the 
“unfinished” status of many of Kafka’s writings – rather than incomplete, they appear as 
interrupted, interrupted by the impossibility of completion. By the same logic, his main 
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stories may be considered “fragments” (as is the totality of the work), a trait that renders 
“their reading unstable” though it is hardly accidental: “It is incorporated in the very meaning 
that it mutilates; it coincides with the representation of an absence that is neither tolerated nor 
rejected.”92 Legal critique runs the same gauntlet. To understand the law, its existence, 
substance and modalities, demands an appreciation of the absence which it conceals; 
however, this absence cannot be expressed as an essential character of the law – the crucial 
task, which Kafka has taken up more assiduously than any other writer, is to offer a glimpse 
into the indeterminate, non-rational and paradoxical experience of being a legal subject. 
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